Introduction

Dimitrios KyritsisÕ book Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory
(Hart Publishing 2015) is a substantial contribution to on-going debates in legal theory.
The main thesis of the book, forcefully argued by the author, is that an interpretivist position along roughly Dworkinian lines not only has the conceptual resources to grapple with the difference that various kinds of collaborating institutions make to legal practice by appealing to normative considerations of institutional design largely pertaining to separation of powers principles, but that it may also occupy a position of advantage when it comes to explaining the institutional nature of law vis-ˆ-vis its main rival, legal positivism. This thesis is both original and surprising, insofar as it is a well-established habit of thought to consider that one of the explanatory advantages of positivist theories is, precisely, their ability to better account for the institutional structure of law than their main anti-positivist rivals. Importantly, Kyritsis subjects Dworkinian interpretivism to a much-needed institutional turn. He maintains that, in order to account for the existence of a multiplicity of collaborating institutions and to elucidate the crucial concept of jurisdiction that helps make sense of it, interpretivism has to undergo a series of transformations. These include, non-exhaustively, substituting the notion of separation of powers for that of integrity, abandoning a narrowly court-centric view of the law in favour of a systemic one and providing a plausible epistemological story about how different kinds of institutions can have access to interpretively construed legal content.
KyritsisÕ overall ambition is to help transcend the apparent deadlock of a by now well-known dialectic consisting in familiar abstract moves and countermoves in the debate between positivist and anti-positivist theories of law, by testing both on the new and relatively underexplored battleground of institutional interaction. In the very opening pages of the book, Kyritsis gives voice to the sense shared by many that continued investment of intellectual resources in the Hart/Dworkin debate yields increasingly diminishing theoretical returns. Kyritsis urges us, instead, to focus on particular areas of law, in order to investigate how well different theories fare. This is as it should be, since we have reason to believe that theory choice in law, like theory choice elsewhere, should be evaluated holistically: choosing (a version of) positivism versus (a version of) antipositivism should be ultimately guided by the fruitfulness of the respective research programmes when it comes to explaining and justifying a wide range of pertinent legal phenomena. The critical part of KyritsisÕ book thus consists precisely in a series of carefully crafted arguments to the effect that influential positivist theories, such as Joseph RazÕs, have trouble explaining collaboration between legislatures and courts, as compared to an institutionally sensitive Dworkinian interpretivism. The hope underpinning KyritsisÕ project is that future debates in legal theory could move to encompass more terrains of particular jurisprudence in both public and private law, thus testing rival theories across the board and not just at an overtly abstract level.
In this short contribution I do not wish to probe the extent to which KyritsisÕ critical arguments against positivism succeed. Instead, I shall focus on further developing the epistemological aspect of an interpretivist view of institutional collaboration along lines that are inspired and, I hope, could be accepted by, Kyritsis himself. My aim is to show that, though it may seem rather remote from DworkinÕs initial version, KyritsisÕ recasting of interpretivism can answer an important objection to which DworkinÕs version appears prima facie vulnerable. My aim is thus to provide further motivation for developing the institutional reworking of interpretivism initiated by Kyritsis as part of a larger project of internal growth of the interpretivist research programme. Throughout, references of page numbers are to KyritsisÕ book.
An Epistemic Challenge to Dworkinian Interpretivism
The objection that I have in mind can be expressed in the following way. DworkinÕs initial formulation of interpretivism roughly asserts that the law consists in the set of principles that both fit and justify the past political practice of a given community.
Moreover, Dworkin himself explicitly framed his interpretivism in court-centric terms, giving the impression to many, and first and foremost to his positivist objectors, that he was in reality advancing not a theory of law, but a theory of how the law should be interpreted from the point of view of the judge (as we shall see later on, and despite the existence of considerable agreement to this effect, I shall suggest that this should not be thought to be the same as a theory of adjudication or of how judges should decide cases).
Abstracting for now from the twin problems of how best to understand the dimensions of how truth-values are considered to be determined, it is natural to suppose that, in order to achieve the epistemic goal of accurately apprehending the pertinent facts, judges need to deploy appropriate epistemic means. Following Bishop and Trout 1 , we may call the epistemic means that judges deploy to this effect Ôreasoning strategiesÕ in a large sense, taking care to note that these comprise not only acts of reasoning, such as making appropriate inferences and moving in a logically correct manner between propositions, but also concrete ways of gathering various kinds of empirical information. Now, it appears reasonable to impose two kinds of normative constraints on the acceptability of judgesÕ reasoning strategies. First, they ought to be reliable, i.e. such as to allow agents to systematically track the relevant facts. This follows from the fact that typically the epistemic goal of judges is the truth about propositions of law and not some other aim, rationality. Bounded rationality models attribute at least part of the explanation for these shortcomings to the scarcity of cognitive resources available to human agents. Mapping out the actual limits of these resources is an important part of cognitive science and empirical psychology. Both conceptualize the mind as a finite information-processing device, strictly limited with regard to its memory, attention and computation capacities.
Bounded rationality accounts ask which reasoning strategies agents with finite cognitive resources ought to follow in order to reliably attain specified epistemic goals for different kinds of environments. Reasoning strategies thus identified are typically resourcerelative: they are tailored to the actual cognitive abilities and resources of human agents.
Now, resource-relativity as a normative constraint on the selection of reasoning strategies can be justified in two ways. The first appeals to ought-implies-can considerations: it is not reasonable to ask of agents that they comply with epistemic norms, compliance with which is impossible, given the agentsÕ actual cognitive setup.
Whilst a lot could be said on how best to unpack what the ÔcanÕ of Ôought-implies-canÕ means, it seems to clearly rule out certain kinds of reasoning strategies, such as those that are computationally intractable. The second appeals to cost/benefit considerations. It follows from resource-relativity that reasoning strategies come at varying costs, some being more expensive than others. As an example, take time. Suppose that part of the difficulty of deciding some cases stems from the fact that complex consequences have to be taken into account, which judges do not have enough time to calculate (abstracting from issues of expertise). If judges had infinite time, they could arguably score better on the reliability dimension. However, judges do not have infinite time and, in fact, they are under relentless time pressure, amplified by the ever-increasing volume of their caseload.
So depending on the circumstances in which they are placed, we might think that judges can sometimes justifiably trade off marginal increases in reliability for speed, by following appropriate reasoning strategies (e.g. a more deferential and less fine-grained standard of review). Generalizing the point, we might say that it is not enough that reasoning strategies score high on the reliability dimension: it is important that they also come at an acceptable cost with regard to the finite epistemic resources of judges. The upshot for the purposes of the present discussion is that reasoning strategies ought to take account of judgesÕ epistemic resources limitations. Even if the relevant facts, whatever they happen to be, would in principle be accessible to resource-independent agents, we still ought to ask, first, whether they are they also in principle accessible to resource- Moreover, and concomitantly, KyritsisÕ second component guarantees that tractability of reasoning strategies will not come at the cost of normative blindness. In fact, the selection of reasoning strategies has itself to be justified by recourse to reasons of political morality and, crucially, of the combination of reasons of content and considerations of institutional design. It is here that KyritsisÕ version of interpretivism can prove to be particularly useful, since not only is it compatible with the tractability constraint, but it can also direct us to track normative institutional reasons that underpin the reliability requirement. These reasons may make it, for example, mandatory for certain officials (e.g. judges) to perform certain kinds of reasoning (e.g. independent assessment of what some constitutional right entails), even if that assessment will come at a cost to reliability. Whether they ought to or not will depend on a normative specification of the officialsÕ duties within the joint project. On this view, reliability is not a consideration external to judicial practices, whose sole function is to truthfully track legal content, but also part of the wider network of values of institutional design that inform the judicial role. Institutional interpretivism can thus provide a general normative framework for assessing both tractability and cost/benefit considerations, as these were identified above. By the same token, it deflects accusations of institutional blindness ˆ la Sunstein and Vermeule and significantly enriches the interpretivist research programme.
We can only hope that the opportunities provided by this conceptual enrichment will be taken up by others to further holistically probe the programmeÕs fruitfulness and explanatory power on the terrain of particular jurisprudence.
